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NOTE
COVERAGE UNDER THE LHWCA AMENDMENTS OF 1972:
DEVELOPING A PRACTICAL, UNIFORMLY APPLICABLE
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUS REQUIREMENT
In 1972 Congress amended the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 1927' (LHWCA) in an attempt to
insure uniform recovery by injured longshoremen independent of
"the fortuitous circumstance of whether the injury occurred on land
or over water."2 The original version of the Act limited the jurisdic-
tion of courts administering the LHWCA3 to those injuries occurring
"upon the navigable waters of the United States",' meaning that
coverage terminated at the water's edge.5 The 1972 amendments
broadened the territorial scope of the coverage provision of the Act,
often referred to as the situs requirement, by including within the
territorial coverage of the LHWCA "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry-
dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employee in loading, unloading, repair-
ing or building a vessel."6 Thus, for the first time, the jurisdiction
of the LHWCA crossed the water's edge and went ashore.
Included within the expanded shoreside jurisdiction were classes
of employees previously not entitled to benefits. In addition to ex-
1. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970)).
2. S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972).
3. Under the original LHWCA, jurisdiction for review or enforcement of compensation was
in the federal district courts. See 33 U.S.C. § 921 (1970) (amended 1972). Under the amended
Act, enforcement of any compensation order remained within the jurisdiction of the district
courts, but power to review orders was given to a three member Benefits Review Board.
The decision of the Board could then be appealed directly to the United States court of
appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred. See 33 U.S.C. § 921 (Supp. II, 1972).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1970) (amended 1972) reads in pertinent part:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or
death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry
dock) ....
5. See notes 10-14 infra & accompanying text.
6. 33 U.S.C. § 903 (a) (Supp. II, 1972) reads in pertinent part:
Compensation shall be payable under this chaptei, in respect of disability or
death of an employee, but only if disability or death results from an injury
occurring upon navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining
pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining
area customarily used by an employee in loading, unloading, repairing, or build-
ing a vessel).
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panding the situs requirement, however, Congress added an entirely
new status requirement, presumably intending to limit the classes
of employees entitled to the extended shoreside coverage. The status
requirement predicated coverage within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Act on the injured worker being a "person engaged in mari-
time employment, including any longshoreman or other person en-
gaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a
ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker .... I
Unfortunately, in attempting to establish uniform recoveries for
maritime employees, Congress enacted provisions courts subse-
quently found difficult to interpret and apply. The difficulty in
determining coverage under the LHWCA arose from the ambiguity
of the 1972 amendments insofar as they describe, or fail to describe
precisely, the employees Congress intended to cover. The situs re-
quirement, although more liberal and complex than the require-
ment under the original Act, involved an objective determination of
whether the injury occurred within territorial limits. Therefore,
courts experienced little difficulty in applying the situs require-
ment.' Similarly, no serious problems arose in applying the status
requirement in cases involving a ship repairman, shipbuilder, or
shipbreaker, apparently because these terms are narrowly defined
and commonly understood in traditional usage.' In contrast, the
Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Ninth Circuits each struggled to apply the ambiguous terms of the
status requirement, "engaged in maritime employment" and "any
longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,"
which are not adequately defined either in common usage or in the
statute.
7. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (Supp. II, 1972) reads:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment,
including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations,
and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-
breaker, but such term does not include a master or member of a crew of any
vessel, or any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small
vessel under eighteen tons net.
8. See, e.g., Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264, 271-72 (1976); Pittston
Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 51 & n. 19, cert. granted sub nom. Northeast
Marine Terminals Inc. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976); I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Rev. Bd.,
529 F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (1975); White v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., No. 751407 (Va. March 4,
1977). For a discussion of the limits of the situs requirement, see Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 541 (1976).
9. See text accompanying note 164 infra.
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The ambiguity of these terms within the status requirement has
resulted in non-uniform coverage under the LHWCA. Nonetheless,
it is possible to reconcile discrepancies in the opinions and to distill
consistent guidelines for interpreting this portion of the requirement
in the amended LHWCA. Given the guidelines suggested by the
circuit courts, this Note endorses the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals'
practical, uniformly applicable interpretation of the requirement.
HISTORY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR MARITIME EMPLOYEES
Pre-LHWCA cases defining the extent of federal admiralty juris-
diction significantly influenced the development of the original Act.
Moreover, judicial interpretations and limitations of the 1927 Act
were largely responsible for the 1972 amendments of LHWCA. Ex-
amination of these precedents facilitates analyzing the amended
LHWCA coverage provisions in proper historical perspective.
Compensation Prior to 1927
The Jensen case
In 1917 the United States Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co.
v. Jensen ° held that a state workmen's compensation law could not
constitutionally apply to a death occurring on the gang plank of a
vessel on navigable waters." The Court reasoned that: "[t]he work
of a stevedore in which the deceased was engaging [was] maritime
in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries
which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights and liabili-
ties .. . . were matters clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction."'
The Court also noted that a need existed for national uniformity in
admiralty and that a state compensation law lacked jurisdiction
beyond the water's edge.' 3 The water's edge, established in Jensen
as the boundary between federal admiralty jurisdiction" and state
10. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
11. Id. at 217. Jensen, a longshoreman, was killed while driving a small freight truck onto
the gangway of a ship anchored in New York harbor. His widow's action was one in admiralty
and litigable in the state courts under the "savings to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of
1789. See note 20 infra & accompanying text. Because the court determined that Jensen's




14. The Constitution establishes federal jurisdiction over cases in admiralty. U.S. CONST.
art. II1, § 2. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress assigned original jurisdiction in
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jurisdiction, became known as the Jensen line.
Adhering to the Jensen line, the courts strictly limited state
courts' jurisdiction to award compensation to maritime employees
injured seaward of the water's edge. 5 State courts were nevertheless
free to award compensation for similar injuries occurring on land.
Denied a remedy in state courts, employees injured within admi-
ralty jurisdiction sought recovery in the federal courts. Because no
system of federal workmen's compensation existed for maritime
employees, the injured party was forced to rely on common law tort
remedies;" generally, the result was no recovery. 7
A limited exception to the strict rule of Jensen allowed applica-
tion of state law to admittedly maritime accidents occurring in
areas of local concern. Under this "maritime but local" doctrine,
injured parties sometimes obtained state compensation for injuries
sustained seaward of the Jensen line." Situations in which the
"maritime but local" exception could be applied were limited, and
therefore the exception was basically ineffective in providing uni-
form relief for injured maritime employees. 9
Legislative Attempts To Provide Compensation
Included in the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting original admiralty
jurisdiction to the federal district courts was a "savings to suitors"
clause under which parties to an admiralty suit retained the right
to a common law remedy if they would have been entitled to such
a remedy in a non-admiralty forum.2 Congress then sought twice to
allow the admiralty courts to apply state workmen's compensation
laws by amending the clause to read "saving to suitors . . . rights
admiralty cases to the district courts. See note 21 infra.
15. See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, 255-56 (1942); Parker v. Motor Boat
Sales, 314 U. S. 244, 250 (1941).
16. The remedies available to injured employees consisted of negligence actions and ac-
tions based on the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness. See note 51 infra.
17. See note 24 infra.
18. See, e.g., Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Western Fuel
Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (1921).
19. The Rohde case suggested that some significant state connection was required, that the
injury must not be directly related to commerce and navigation, and that application of state
law should not affect the admiralty law. 257 U. S. at 477.
20. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76 (current version at 28 U. S. C. § 1333 (1970))
provided in pertinent part: "That the district courts shall have ... exclusive original cogniz-
ance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it
[Vol. 18:555
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and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any
State."'" Both attempts to effect this change,22 however, were
stricken as unconstitutional delegations of the federally reserved
admiralty jurisdiction. 3
The LHWCA of 1927
In 1927, however, Congress enacted the LHWCA, which was
drafted to provide a no-fault federal workmen's compensation rem-
edy 4 for those maritime workers who could not be compensated by
the state acts." The tacit understanding appeared to be that the Act
adopted the Jensen line as the division between state and federal
jurisdiction." The relevant coverage provision read:
Compensation shall be payable . .. in respect of disability or
death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results
from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United
States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability
or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not
validly be provided by State law.27
21. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, § 1, 40 Stat. 395.
22. The second attempt to amend the clause was made in 1922. The amendment was
almost identical to its predecessor. Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, § b, 42 Stat. 634.
23. See Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) (declaring 1922 amendment
unconstitutional on grounds of constituting unlawful delegation of legislative power); Knick-
erbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (declaring 1917 amendment unconstitutional
on grounds of unlawfully delegating legislative power of Congress and frustrating constitu-
tional goal to provide uniformity in maritime law).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 904 (b) (1970) provides: "Compensation shall be payable irrespective of
fault as a cause for the injury." The text of the section as originally enacted was more
descriptive of the importance of the Act's provision:
In such action [under the LHWCA] the defendant may not plead as a defense
that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, nor that the
employee assumed the risk of his employment, nor that the injury was due to
the contributory negligence of the employee.
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act of 1927, ch. 509, § 5, 44 Stat. 1426.
As a result of this provision, the employee covered by the Act, was not subject to the "unholy
trinity" of defenses used to prevent employee recoveries in common law actions. See generally
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 AT 525-30 (4th ed. 1971).
25. See 33 U.S.C. § 903 (a) (1970) (amended 1972).
26. See Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, 255-56 (1942); Parker v. Motor Boat
Sales, 314 U. S. 244, 250-51 (1941).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1970) (amended 1972) (emphasis supplied). The restriction that
federal compensation was not obtainable if recovery could be validly provided by state law
essentially incorporated the "maritime but local" doctrine originating in pre-1927 Supreme
Court decisions into the 1927 Act. Judicial interpretation of the doctrine's effect on the
restriction caused considerable uncertainty and litigation until 1962 when the court, in
Calbeck v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962), held that the doctrine did not affect
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Unfortunately, the "maritime but local" concept led to uncertain-
ties and inequities in the application of both the federal and state
schemes. It was unclear, for example, whether the pre-1927 cases
establishing the "maritime but local" exception validly provided
compensation under state law within the meaning of the LHWCA,
and thereby precluded the federal law's application in "maritime
but local" areas." This uncertainty created a zone in which state
jurisdiction could not be established easily nor could federal law
clearly apply. 9 To alleviate the effects of this uncertainty, the Su-
preme Court developed the "twilight zone" theory in Davis v. De-
partment of Labor & Industries.30 Recognizing concurrent federal
and state jurisdiction over certain areas of navigable waters, the
court concluded that the determination whether the employee was
subject to a state statute or to the LHWCA was a question of fact."
Therefore, the twilight zone clearly did not promote consistency or
uniformity. Moreover, during the two decades following Davis, al-
though amounts of compensation provided under the LHWCA in-
creased substantially, those under state programs did not.32 As the
federal courts' jurisdiction to award compensation under the Act. See notes 28-34 infra &
accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Hohn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959) (jurisdiction
depends on facts); Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942) (jurisdiction depends
on facts); Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930) (federal law given exclusive
jurisdiction); Miller's Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1925) (state law given exclusive
jurisdiction). For a discussion of the problem, see Morrison, Workmen's Compensation and
the Maritime Law, 38 YALE L.J. 472. (1929).
29. The Supreme Court illustrated the consequence of the dilemma: "[To] conclude that
federal coverage extends to the limits of navigable waters, except in those cases where a state
compensation remedy may constitutionally be provided, would mean that, contrary to con-
gressional purpose, some injuries to employees on navigable waters might not be compensable
under any statute." Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 125 (1962).
30. 317 U.S. 249 (1942) (employee using barge as platform while engaged in repair of
bridge).
31. Id. at 256.
32. Even so, prior to the 1972 amendments, the compensation allowed under the LHWCA
was fairly low. At the inception of the Act, the compensation permitted was two-thirds of the
injured employee's average weekly wage with a maximum recovery of twenty-five dollars per
week. Act of Mar. 4, 1927, ch. 509, § 6, 44 Stat. 1424. In 1948, the maximum recovery was
raised to thirty-five dollars per week. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 623, § 1, 62 Stat. 602. In 1956,
the maximum allowed was increased to fifty-four dollars per week. Act of June 26, 1956, ch.
735, § 1, 70 Stat. 654. In 1961, the maximum rose to seventy dollars per week and remained
at that level until 1972. Act of July 14, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-87, § 1, 75 Stat. 203. Under the
1972 amendments, maximum compensation remained at two-thirds of the employee's average
weekly wage, but the maximum recovery changed from a dollar figure to a percentage of the
national average weekly wage. Since October 1, 1975, the maximum recovery has been 200
percent of the national average. See 33 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. II, 1972).
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disparity widened, increased attempts by claimants to recover
under the LHWCA emphasized the need for a definitive delineation
of the extent of jurisdiction. Finally, in Calbeck v. Travelers Insur-
ance Company,33 the Supreme Court concluded that Congress in-
tended to cover all injuries received on navigable waters whether or
not the injury also could be remedied constitutionally by state work-
men's compensation.34 Calbeck returned the jurisdictional limits of
the LHWCA to the Jensen line, but retained a "twilight zone" in
which the employee could seek relief either under a state act or
under the LHWCA. 5
The need for legislative intervention in the controversy was mani-
fest in the Supreme Court decisions Nacirema Operating Co. v.
Johnson8 and Victory Carriers Inc. v. Law. 7 In Nacirema, a federal
court denied recovery under the Act for injury or death occurring on
piers while loading cargo from railroad cars onto ship's cranes."
Affirming that decision, the Supreme Court held that the language
restricting recovery to injuries "upon navigable waters" prevented
recovery on a pier affixed to land. 9 In rejecting the contention that
the Extension of Admiralty Act" amended the LHWCA to allow
longshoremen on piers to recover," the Court restated the
"extension of land" doctrine, under which structures such as piers
and wharves that are permanently affixed to land are considered
extensions of land, thus precluding recovery in admiralty.' The
decision emphasized the inequity of having an arbitrary line mark
a significant difference in recoveries for similar injuries. Reacting to
this inequity, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Bren-
33. 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
34. Id. at 115-31.
35. Id: at 131-32.
36. 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
37. 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
38. 396 U.S. at 213-14.
39. Id. at 215-21.
40. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). The Act provided in pertinent part: "The admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include all cases of damage or
injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that
such damage or injury be done or consummated on land."
41. The Court reasoned that "the Extension Act was passed to remedy the completely
different problem that arose from the fact that parties aggrieved by injuries done by ships to
bridges, docks, and the like could not get into admiralty-at all. There is no evidence that
Congress thereby intended to amend or affect the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act." 396
U.S. at 222.
42. See Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946); State Indus. Comm'n v. Narden-
holt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922).
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nan, dissented, and adopted the reasoning of Judge Sobeloff in
Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting," that is, that the LHWCA
was "status oriented, reaching all injuries sustained by longshore-
men in the course of their employment.""
Similarly, in Victory Carriers, the Court held that a longshore-
man could not recover for injuries sustained while using his em-
ployer's forklift on the dock to load a ship.45 Refusing to move the
LHWCA jurisdiction onto the pier, the Court expressed fears that
state remedies would be pre-empted or displaced"0 and stated that
"if denying federal remedies to longshoremen injured on land is
intolerable, Congress has ample power under Arts. I and II of the
Constitution to enact a suitable solution."47
THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
Even though Calbeck delineated the extent of jurisdiction under
the LHWCA, adherence to the Jensen line in situations similar to
those in Nacirema and Victory did not achieve equitable compensa-
tion. Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan attempted to cure the
inequity by judicially extending the coverage of the Act inland.48
Although conceding that the inequity might be "intolerable," the
majority of the Court refused to engage in the judicial legislation
necessary for extending jurisdiction."9
In amending the LHWCA, Congress accepted the Supreme
Court's invitation to extend the jurisdiction of the Act shoreward.5 0
The amendments, however, represented a trade-off. In return for
increased territorial jurisdiction under the Act, longshoremen for-
43. 398 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub nor. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396
U.S. 212 (1969).
44. 398 F.2d at 904. Justice Douglas adopted this argument in his dissent. 396 U.S. at 224.
45. 404 U.S. at 203.
46. Id. at 212.
47. Id. at 216.
48. See Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 224-25 (1969). (Douglas, Bren-
nan & Black, JJ., dissenting).
49. 404 U.S. at 216. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
50. Id. at 216. In Nacirema as well, the Court rejected the notion that they could judicially
interpret coverage under the LHWCA to coincide with the limits of admiralty jurisdiction:
While we have no doubt that Congress had the power [to make the coverage of
LHWCA coincide with the limits of admiralty jurisdiction], the plain fact is
that it chose instead the line in Jensen separating water from land at the edge
of the pier. The invitation to move that line landward must be addressed to
Congress, and not to this Court.
396 U.S. at 223-24.
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feited most of their non-LHWCA remedies against vessels and em-
ployers.5' The shoreward expansion of territorial jurisdiction of the
LHWCA was substantial. Coverage under the original LHWCA had
been based on "an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States .. ''52 Although the amended Act retained this
general language, the amendment parenthetically defined "navi-
gable waters of the United States" as "including any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other
adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unload-
ing, repairing, or building a vessel", 5 thus expanding significantly
the territory covered by the LHWCA.
This expansion of territorial jurisdiction, however, was not an
absolute expansion of coverage; in addition to the territorial situs
requirement, the amended LHWCA contained a status requirement
restricting coverage to maritime employees. As defined by Congress,
a covered employee encompassed "any person engaged in maritime
employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged
in longshoring operations . . . . "54 In adopting a status approach to
determining coverage as suggested by Judge Sobeloff in Marine
Stevedoring and as endorsed by Justice Douglas in Nacirema,5 5 Con-
gress, however, failed to define precisely the terms of the require-
ment.
The amended LHWCA therefore abandoned the well-defined
water's edge as an inequitable, artificial line and adopted, in its
51. From the stevedore's point of view, the object of the trade-off was to eliminate the effect
of the seaworthiness doctrine under which the vessel's owner was strictly liable for injuries
sustained because of any fault of the vessel. Although originally only seamen were allowed to
recover under the doctrine, it was extended to longshoremen injured on board a vessel by Sea
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). Under theories of express or implied warranty,
the vessels' owner generally succeeded in recovering damages from the stevedore when the
owners were held liable to injured longshoremen. Liability therefore was transferred to the
stevedore, the actual employer of the longshoremen, thus increasing the costs and legal fees.
The amendments eliminated suits under the seaworthiness doctrine, indemnification actions,
and warranty or indemnity agreements. It did not eliminate suits against vessels or third
parties for negligence. See 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. H, 1972). See generally Comment, The
Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act Amendments of 1972: An End to
Circular Liability and Seaworthiness in Return for Modern Benefits, 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 94
(1972).
52. See note 4 supra. The single parenthetical inclusion of "any drydock" reflected the
judicial precedents including drydocked ships in the admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g., The
Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130 (1909).
53. See note 6 supra.
54. See note 7 supra.
55. See notes 43 & 44 supra & accompanying text.
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place, a relatively complex, two-part test for measuring the extent
of the Act's coverage. Despite the comparative complexity of the
revised situs requirement, courts experienced little difficulty in de-
termining territorial jurisdiction." Deciding which workers were
entitled to coverage proved more difficult, however. The principal
problem was construing the term "engaged in maritime employ-
ment." Individually, the Courts of Appeals for the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits addressed the issue and
reached divergent results.57 This disparity among the courts has
frustrated the goals of uniformity and equity in LHWCA compensa-
tion. To achieve these goals, these judicial interpretations of the
new status requirement of the LHWCA must be reconciled, and a
practical, uniform approach to determining coverage under the
LHWCA adopted.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
Fourth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the ques-
tion of the extent of coverage under the 1972 amendments in I. T. 0.
Corp. v. Benefits Review Board.5 In I. T. 0., the court attempted to
specify those shoreside workers entitled to coverage under the Act.
With the situs requirement sufficiently broadened to include practi-
cally all waterfront workers," the difficulty was determining what
qualified as maritime employment. The court's interpretation of
"maritime employment" turned on a concept of "point of rest," the
first storage or holding area during unloading.
Three claims were consolidated for appeal in . T. 0. The Adminis-
trative Law Judge who heard the claims and the Benefits Review
56. See note 8 supra.
57. The circuit courts each deemed the interpretation of the status requirement to be the
central issue. Stockham v. John T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264, 271-72 (1st Cir. 1976); Pitts-
ton Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Northeast Marine Terminals Inc. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir.
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976); Dravo Corp. v. Maxin, 545
F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1976); I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Rev. Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1084 (4th Cir. 1975);
Jacksonville Shipyards Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976); Weyerhaeuser v. Gilmore,
528 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1975). The Virginia Supreme Court has also addressed the issue
in White v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., No. 751407 (Va. March 4, 1977).
58. 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1976), modifying on rehearing 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1975).
59. All of the claimants in I.T. 0. satisfied the situs test. "As a minimum, they were
injured at a terminal, adjoining navigable waters, used in the overall process of loading and
unloading a vessel." 529 F.2d at 1084.
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Board that approved the awards0 found that claimants Adkins,
Brown, and Harris were engaged in maritime employment.' The
employers and their insurance carriers appealed from the awards
granted to the claimants and presented the question of maritime
employment to the Court of Appeals. Adkins had been injured while
moving the contents of a container from a storage area onto a wait-
ing delivery truck." Brown had been injured while "stuffing" 3 a
shipping container for delivery to a waiting vessel. 4 Harris worked
as a "hustler" 5 and had received his injury while moving a con-
tainer, stuffed with goods stored after inland delivery, from the
stuffing area to the marshalling area.6 In construing the meaning
of "maritime employment," the court believed it necessary to con-
sider the legislative history of the amendments, 7 initially examining
language in committee reports indicating an intent to extend cover-
age only to those "who would otherwise be covered by this Act
60. The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA created the Benefits Review Board as a quasi-
judicial intermediate step between the administrative judge and the courts of appeals. The
amendments gave the three member Board independent authority to hear and determine
questions of law or fact. See 33 U.S.C.§ 921(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
61. 529 F.2d at 1081.
62. Adkins was a forklift operator who sustained his injuries while he was moving a load
of brass tubing from its storage place in a warehouse to a waiting delivery truck which would
transport it to its ultimate destination. He thus performed a function in the overall unloading
of the ship and in the discharge of its cargo from the terminal. The tubing, packed in a
container, had arrived at the terminal seven days earlier aboard a ship. Upon arrival, the
container had been removed from the vessel to a marshalling area. Three days later, the
container was moved to a transit shed where it was "stripped" or unloaded and the tubing
stored to await transportation to its destination. The delivery truck did not arrive until four
days later. Shortly thereafter Adkins was injured loading the tubing with his forklift. 529 F.2d
at 1082.
63. "Stuffing" is the term used to describe the process of loading a container with cargo.
Containers are rectangular metal structures used to transport cargo. After unloading these
containers off the vessel by crane, they are equipped with a chassis and wheels and converted
into large box trailers capable of being hauled on the highways by tractors.
64. Brown suffered carbon monoxide poisoning while employed as a forklift operator at
Marine Terminals. His job was to move loads of cargo, arriving at the terminal by rail or
truck, to an empty container to be stuffed. 529 F.2d at 1082.
65. A "hustler" moves fully loaded containers from the stuffing area to the marshalling
area.
66. Harris was injured when, due to brake failure, the vehicle he was driving collided with
a shipping container. Harris moved containers from the long-term container storage area to
the container marshalling area and was on the return trip to the long-term storage area to
pick up another container when the injury occured. 529 F.2d at 1082.
67. Id. at 1084-85. In a strong dissent, Judge Craven discerned no need to consult legislative
history, id. at 1090-91, in that he found no ambiguity in the literal terms of the statute and
contended that the legislative history was vague, contradictory, and misleading. Id. at 1094-
95.
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[before amendment] for part of their activity." 8 Read in this con-
text, this phrase would extend coverage to those workers who
crossed the water's edge as a part of their particular job function but
were injured in an adjoining land area. Significantly, however, the
court declined to adhere precisely to the letter of the committees'
statement that the statute would apply only to persons who would
have been covered by the Act before amendment, concluding that
even employees "engaged in moving cargo between ship and point
of rest who never cross the water's edge . . [would] be eligible for
benefits"" because they were within the point of rest and performed
traditional longshoring functions. Therefore, the court departed
from a literal interpretation of the legislative history.
The court in L T. 0. favored a strict construction of the statute and
adopted a construction based on an illustrative example found in
the committee report submitted by the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare:
To take a typical example, cargo, whether in break bulk or con-
tainerized form, is typically unloaded from the ship and immedi-
ately transported to a storage or holding area on the pier, wharf,
or terminal adjoining navigable waters. The employees who per-
form this work would be covered under the bill for injuries sus-
tained by them over the navigable waters or on the adjoining land
area. The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are
not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel,
just because they are injured in an area adjoining navigable wa-
ters used for such activity. Thus, employees whose reponsibility
is only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-shipment would
not be covered .... 70
Focusing on the concept of "stored cargo" as the definitive point in
the overall process of loading and unloading, the court apparently
assumed that the first storage or holding area to which goods were
taken during unloading and the point at which persons "pick up
stored cargo for further trans-shipment" were intended, by the com-
mittee, to denote the same geographical point.7'
68. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 4698, 4708.
69. 529 F.2d at 1088.
70. S. REp. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4708.
71. 529 F.2d at 1086-87.
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In rejecting the contention of the Benefits Review Board that
benefits under the Act extended to all persons handling cargo or
performing related functions in the terminal area, the court ad-
vanced a "point of rest" theory, adopting the first storage or holding
area during unloading and the last storage or holding area during
loading as the definitive point of rest.7 The Fourth Circuit opinion
concluded that the point of rest was the limiting geographical point
for establishing coverage or non-coverage.73 Thus, maritime employ-
ment was deemed to encompass only the immediate process of load-
ing and unloading between the vessel and the point of rest. Under
this restricted view of maritime employment, longshoremen injured
landward of the first point of rest were deemed outside the coverage
of the Act regardless of their particular job function.74
The claims in LT. 0. subsequently were reheard en banc by the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.75 On rehearing, the point
of rest test was accepted by three judges. Judge Widener, however,
deemed dispositive whether the "otherwise eligible employee [was]
injured while engaged in loading or unloading a ship."" Yet, stating
that an employee was covered if he was loading or unloading a vessel
merely reiterated the statute. Moreover, Judge Widener applied the
new test as though he were applying the point of rest theory re-
phrased in non-geographic terms. Implicit in his understanding of
the loading or unloading process was the view that prior to the
arrival of cargo at a point of rest, the loading process had not
begun." Thus the new majority retained the essentially territorial
view of the point of rest theory.
The majority en banc held that as Adkins was injured while han-
dling cargo for transhipment he was not participating in the unload-
ing process and thus was not entitled to coverage under the Act.7
In Brown's and Harris' cases, three judges believed that the claim-
72. Id. In applying the point of rest theory to the cases at bar, the majority concluded that
the marshalling area adjacent to the pier was the point of rest. Because Adkins was injured
landward of the first point of rest and Brown and Harris were injured landward of the last
point of rest, the court allowed no coverage. Id. at 1087-88. See notes 62-66 supra.
73. Id. at 1087.
74. Id. at 1088.
75. 542 F.2d 903 (1976).
76. Id. at 905. Judge Widener did not submit a separate opinion; rather, his views were
described by Judge Winter in the majority opinion.
77. Id. The point of rest to which Judge Widener made implicit reference was not the same
as the point of rest referred to by the other judges.
78. Id.
19771
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ants were involved in the loading process although landward of the
point of rest. In a divided decision, the court upheld Brown's and
Harris' claims as entitled to coverage. 79
After the I. T.O. rehearing, the Fourth Circuit's construction of
maritime employment in the context of longshoring operations re-
mained unresolved. Three judges supported the point of rest theory;
two judges adamantly opposed it. Apparently satisfied to resolve the
issue ad hoc, the sixth judge merely espoused an ambiguous theory
of "loading and unloading."80
Second Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the extent
of shoreside coverage of the LHWCA in Pittston Stevedoring Corp.
v. Dellaventura.5 ' The case consolidated four petitions to review
orders of the Benefits Review Board affirming compensation awards
made to four workers. Two of the claims involved the loading and
unloading of containers; the other two claims resulted from loading
cargo into consignee's trucks on a pier.82 Two petitions subsequently
were dismissed because of untimeliness and lack of a justiciable
controversy;83 the claims of claimant Blundo who was injured while
employed as a "checker"8 and claimant Caputo who was employed
as a terminal laborer5 remained.
Although recognizing that the 1972 amendments extended the
coverage of the Act, the petitioners in Pittston nevertheless argued
that the extension was limited to facts comparable to those in
79. Id.
80. Judge Winter, Judge Russell, and Chief Judge Haynsworth supported the point of rest
theory. Judge Craven and Judge Butzner opposed the theory as a judicial gloss on the 1972
Amendments to LHWCA.
81. 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976) cert. granted, 97 S.Ct. 522 (1976).
82. Id. at 41-42.
83. Id. at 42-46.
84. A "checker" checks the contents of a container carrying goods for several consignees
against the bills of lading or other records. Blundo, who was employed as a "checker", slipped
on ice and injured himself while checking cargo being removed from a container on the pier
within 40 feet of the water. The container he was checking had been unloaded a few days
before at another pier and taken by truck over city streets to the "stripping" pier. Id. at 41.
85. Caputo usually was employed at terminal labor. If there was no work available there
he took a "shape up" job as a longshoreman whenever it was available. On the day of the
accident, he was working at a terminal adjoining the water and was injured while inside a
truck helping a cargo consignee's truck driver load boxes of cheese that had been discharged
from a vessel at least five days earlier. Id. at 42.
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Nacirema,58 in which the employees were injured on the pier.
In contrast, the injured claimants, the International Longshore-
men's Association, and the Solicitor of Labor contended that the
extension of coverage was greater than that suggested by the narrow
reading urged by the petitioners; they maintained that "the process
of unloading a vessel continues until the cargo is deposited on the
consignee's truck on the pier (or begins, in the case of loading, when
the goods are being removed from the delivery truck), and that
anyone physically participating in this process is engaged in mari-
time employment.""7 The court perfunctorily rejected petitioners'
restrictive reading of the coverage provisions yet declined to decide
whether it fully endorsed the scope of coverage espoused by the
respondents.8
Writing for the majority, Judge Friendly began analysis of the
1972 amendments by endorsing the principle that remedial
legislation should be construed liberally.8 Without specifically at-
tempting to construe the statute liberally, the court immediately
proceeded to examine the Act's legislative history to determine the
scope of the phrase "person engaged in maritime employment, in-
cluding any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring
operations . ".8.."10 On the basis of the legislative history, the court
read this to mean "any longshoremen or other person engaged in
longshoring activity or engaged in other maritime employment"?'
The court viewed the language of the Senate Committee Report on
Labor and Public Welfare as corroborating such a blanket inclusion
of longshoremen as a covered class of workers. The Report stated:
The Committee believes that the compensation payable to a
longshoreman or a ship repairman or builder should not depend
on the fortuitous circumstances of whether the injury occurred on
land or over water. Accordingly, the bill would amend the act to
provide coverage of longshoremen, harbor workers ... and other
employees engaged in maritime employment . . . if the injury
86. See notes 36, 38-44 supra & accompanying text. Nacirema reversed the en banc deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Marine Stevedoring.
87. 544 F.2d at 46-47.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 51. "This Act must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, and
in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous results." Id., quoting Voris v. Eikel, 346 U. S.
328, 333 (1953) (commenting on the original version of the LHWCA).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (Supp. I, 1972).
91. 544 F.2d at 52.
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occurred either upon the navigable waters of the United States
[or designated adjoining area] .2
Even more significant to the court was that the Act specifically
mentions in its definition of employee, "any longshoreman" as well
as any other "person engaged in longshoring operations. 93 The
court deemed this specific inclusion to mean that such a worker at
times would be covered even when he was not performing traditional
longshoring activities,94 that is, "irrespective of the employee's posi-
tion vis-a-vis a 'point of rest' ,." As the court argued persuasively,
inasmuch as even the petitioner conceded that persons moving un-
loaded cargo to its first point of rest, or moving cargo to be loaded
from its last point of rest, are "engaged in longshoring operations",
if only they were entitled to coverage, there would have been no
reason to provide as well for any longshoreman. 6 Therefore, this
blanket inclusion of all longshoremen means simply that the Act
covers workers injured while performing longshoring activities any-
where within the situs requirement, and not that the Act affords
coverage to any longshoreman injured on a pier no matter what he
actually is doing when injured. 7 For, as the court emphasized upon
concluding its analysis of these statutory provisions, its interpreta-
tion does not encompass all employment-related injuries occurring
within the situs specified by the Act. 9
In determining what Congress meant by the term
"longshoreman," the court stated correctly that neither the title of
the worker's job, nor that of his union, should be dispositive.9 Upon
examining the legislative history,100 the court noted that the Senate
92. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1972), reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4708.
93. 544 F.2d at 52.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 53.
96. Id. at 52.
97. Id. at 47.
98. Id. at 56.
99. Id. at 52.
100. The court once again referred to the committee reports, seemingly extracting a satis-
factory answer from the following language:
The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation system to
apply to employees who would otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their
activity . . . . The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not
engaged in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they
are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity. Thus,
employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-
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and House Committee reports had expressly excluded the following
workers from coverage: those whose only responsibility was to pick
up stored cargo for further transshipment, 10 and those purely cleri-
cal workers whose jobs did not require them to participate in the
loading and unloading of cargo."2 Furthermore, the court perceived
that Congress had been concerned with the advent of modern cargo-
handling techniques such as containerization. 03 Asserting that
stripping a container of goods destined for different consignees is the
functional equivalent of sorting cargo discharged from a ship onto
the dock and that stuffing a container is a part of loading the vessel
even if performed on land and not in a cargo hold, the court con-
cluded that Congress intended to cover persons performing these
activities if they met the situs test of the Act. 10 Thus, persons in-
volved in the loading and unloading processes, necessitated by mod-
ern cargo-handling techniques, were afforded coverage. For, the
court discerned that Congress intended to provide uniform cover-
age for persons engaged in loading or unloading functions on land'"5
so as to minimize the occasions on which longshoremen and other
harbor workers would forfeit the liberal benefits of the LHWCA for
shipment would not be covered, nor would purely clerical employees whose jobs
do not require them to participate in the loading or unloading of cargo. However,
checkers, for example who are directly involved in the loading or unloading
functions are covered by the new amendment. Likewise the Committee has no
intention of extending coverage under the Act to individuals who are not em-
ployed by a person who is an employer, i.e. a person at least some of whose
employees are engaged, in whole or in part in some form of maritime employ-
ment. Thus, an individual employed by a person none of whose employees work,
in whole or in part, on navigable waters, is not covered even if injured on a pier
adjoining navigable waters.
544 F.2d at 52, quoting S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1972), reprinted in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4708. See also text accompanying note 70 supra
for additional language from the committee reports upon which the court relied.
101. In discussing this description of excluded persons, the court asserted that cargo would
not be considered "stored" merely because the consignee wanted five days to pick it up. 544
F.2d at 54. Implicit in this comment is the view that time is an integral element in determin-
ing whether cargo is "stored." As the facts of the case did not require it, the court declined
to decide whether cargo should ever be considered "stored" as long as it remained on the pier
in the custody of the stevedore employed by the vessel rather than being placed in a public
warehouse. The Court observed, however, that a delay of 133 days, as had occurred in another
case, might have necessitated such a decision.
102. 544 F.2d at 53.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 53-54.
105. Id. at 54. The court quoted with approval from the committee report: "The intent of
the Committee is to permit a uniform compensation system to apply to employees who would
otherwise be covered by this Act for part of their activity." See note 100 supra.
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the much lower state benefits by simply moving or walking across
an imaginary line in the normal course of their employment.'
The court affirmed an award to Caputo although he had been
injured inside a consignee's truck. Emphasizing the realities of what
it deemed "life on the waterfront", the court noted that dock work-
ers often aid the consignee's driver so as to expedite the loading
process and to minimize dock congestion. As the court concluded
correctly, it would have been "wholly artificial" to uphold an award
to Caputo for an injury occurring while he was moving the cargo
down the dock to the consignee's truck and yet to deny the award
merely because the injury occurred inside the truck.07 Consistent
with the liberal interpretation mandated by this remedial statute,
the court held that the Act at least covers
all persons meeting the situs requirements (1) who are engaged
in stripping or stuffing containers or (2) are engaged in the han-
dling of cargo up to the point where the consignee has actually
begun its movement from the pier (or in the case of loading, from
the time when the consignee has stopped his vehicle at the pier),
provided in the latter instances that the employee has spent a
significant part of his time in the typical longshoring activity of
taking cargo on or off a vessel. 08
Apparently the additional requirement that cargo handlers must
have spent a significant part of their time in typical longshoring
activity, that is, crossing the water's edge to load or unload a vessel,
was added in light of the following language in the committee re-
ports: "The intent of the Committee is to permit a uniform compen-
sation system to apply to employees who would otherwise be covered
by this Act [before amendment] for part of their activity."''0 Be-
cause both claimants had spent substantial time in typical long-
shoring activity, however, the court declined to decide whether this
additional requirement was essential."0 It appears, nevertheless,
that such a requirement might prove difficult to apply, given the
imprecision of the term "substantial time."
Nonetheless, in interpreting the LHWCA as extending coverage
to any longshoreman, including strippers and stuffers, and to per-
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis supplied).
108. Id. at 56.
109. See note 100 supra.
110. 544 F.2d at 56.
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sons such as cargo handlers who are engaged for a significant time
in typical longshoring operations, and in suggesting these categories
were properly delimited by the scope of the loading and unloading
processes in the context of modern-cargo handling techniques, the
Second Circuit correctly focused on functional criteria as determi-
native of coverage and enumerated some of the covered functions.
Moreover, although the court conceded that its more liberal con-
struction in part "rea[d] the status requirement out of the Act,""'
it stressed that its construction did not do so completely. For, as
noted previously, the court expressly rejected the contention in one
commentary" ' that the amendments could properly be read to en-
compass all employment-related injuries occurring within the Act's
territorial limits. Such a rejection further corroborates that the Sec-
ond Circuit required a nexus between the employee's injury and his
participation in the overall process of loading and unloading.
First Circuit
Shortly after Pittston, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
confronting similar facts, addressed the issue of coverage in
Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 3 and rejected, as did the
Second Circuit, any approach that would completely abrogate the
status requirement by providing federal coverage for all injuries
occurring within the Act's territorial limits."' Furthermore, the
court in Stockman concurred in the Second Circuit's view that a
claimant's status need not depend on the job being performed at the
very moment of injury."5 Rather, the court deemed that determin-
ing a worker's status required looking at the nature of his regularly
assigned duties as a whole."' For example, the court suggested that
Congress intended to include a regularly employed longshoreman
whose duties periodically required him to board a vessel, but who
at the time of his injury was engaged in moving cargo shoreward of
the point of rest."' Stockman was employed on the Boston water-
front and was injured while moving the contents of a container that
previously had been off-loaded from a vessel. The employer oper-
111. Id.
112. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6.51 at 430 (1975).
113. 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976).
114. Id. at 274.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 275.
117. Id.
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ated as a stevedore and as a terminal operator."8 In this dual capac-
ity, the employer, using commercial truckers, hauled containers to
a stripping and stuffing area approximately two miles by land or
eight hundred feet across open water from the port where the con-
tainers had been off-loaded."' The complainant's injury occurred
within this stripping and stuffing area, in other words, shoreward
of the point of rest. Nonetheless, because the work area was part of
a terminal and was an "adjoining area used for loading and unload-
ing a vessel", the court concluded that Stockman satisfied the situs
requirement, 20 thus expressly rejecting the Fourth Circuit's point of
rest analysis as perpetuating the evil of "bifurcated coverage for
essentially the same employment.'
2
'
The court, however, concurred with the views of the Second and
Fourth Circuits that the terms "longshoremen", "maritime em-
ployment", and "longshoring operations" do not have such well
established meanings that the case could be decided without resort-
ing to legislative history. 2 2 Given both the narrow interpretation in
I. T. 0., limiting coverage to those performing the immediate loading
and unloading of ships, and the more expansive reading in Pittston,
extending coverage to those participating in the overall process of
loading and unloading a vessel, the court in Stockman believed that
Pittston better effectuated congressional intent. 3
118. Id. at 266.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 272. The court dismissed the great distance the cargo travelled between off-
loading and stripping as inconsequential for purposes of the situs requirement, stating: "we
do not think Congress meant necessarily to limit 'adjoining' to only those areas directly
adjoining the berth of the specific vessel being unloaded." The terminal in which the injury
occurred was in a location customarily used in loading or unloading vessels and therefore met
the situs requirement, although the cargo being stripped when the injury occurred had been
off-loaded elsewhere. Id.
121. Id. at 275.
122. Id. at 272.
123. According to the court, the legislative history evinced the following legislative intent:
1) The amendments are to be construed to achieve a "uniform compensation
system" which does not depend on the "fortuitous circumstance of whether the
injury occurred on land or over water."
2) The amendments are to afford coverage to employees, or possibly classes of
employees, who would otherwise have been covered for part of their activity by
the earlier Act.
3) One of the reasons for affording coverage on land is that "with the advent
of modern cargo-handling techniques, such as containerization and use of
LASH-type vehicles, more of the longshoreman's work is performed on land
than heretofore."
Id. at 274-75.
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Stressing the realities of maritime employment, the court noted,
as did the Second Circuit, that modem cargo handling techniques,
requiring that longshoremen to work more on land, had necessitated
this shoreside extension of coverage.' 4 Therefore, although the court
deduced from the legislative history that coverage was intended for
those who formerly would have been covered for part of their activ-
ity, that is, those whose duties involve shipboard activity, it recog-
nized that even traditional longshoring activities at times were or-
ganized so that some workers always remained on the pier in partici-
pating in the overall loading and unloading process, and observed
that such men are just as much longshoremen as are their colleagues
on the ship.'2 5 By thus focusing on functional criteria, the court in-
terpreted the legislative history and the Act as simply mandating
"bona fide membership in a class of employees whose members
would for the most part have been covered some of the time under
the earlier act-not necessarily a demonstration by each claimant
that he individually would have been covered.""' Therefore, it
deemed, as did the Second Circuit, that a person within the situs
requirement, who strips containers holding unsorted cargo, destined
for several consignees, was a longshoreman under the Act regardless
of whether his individual duties required him to go aboard ship.'"
Hence, the First Circuit applied functional criteria in expressly ex-
tending coverage to those employees engaged in stripping containers
but did not attempt to enumerate all classes or functions of employ-
ees to which coverage might extend.
Ninth Circuit
The coverage provisions of the amended Act also were interpreted
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Gilmore' s2 on decidedly different facts involving no longshoremen.
In Weyerhaeuser, the court concluded correctly that although the
1972 amendments expanded and liberalized the situs requirement
for coverage, they restricted the status requirement by requiring the
124. Id. at 275-76.
125. Id. at 277.
126. Id. The court, however, did reserve decision on whether workers who are not clearly
longshoremen, or otherwise specifically included in some recognized category of maritime
employment, might have to demonstrate their entitlement to coverage by showing that their
duties encompassed shipboard activity.
127. Id.
128. 528 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1975).
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worker to be engaged in "maritime employment." As a test of mari-
time employment, the court held that an employee's own work, as
distinguished from his employer's diversified operations, must have
"a realistically significant relationship to traditional maritime ac-
tivity involving navigation and commerce on the navigable waters
. . "129 Weyerhaeuser concerned a "pondman"' 30 injured while
working at his duties sorting logs floating on a saltwater bay of the
Pacific Ocean. The unique facet of the case was that the complain-
ant clearly would have been covered under LHWCA prior to the
1972 amendments. 3' Nonetheless, reasoning that a pondman's du-
ties in an inland lake or river certainly could not be considered
"maritime employment", the court concluded that although the
complainant was injured on a navigable waterway, he did not qual-
ify for coverage under the amended LHWCA. 12
Third Circuit
In Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compen-
sation Programs, 3  the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also
examined the scope of the amended LHWCA coverage provisions,
concluding that "[t]he line delimiting the outer reaches of the
Act's extended coverage is . . . functional and not spatial.' '34 Al-
though the court considered Judge Friendly's approach valid, it
chose to view the problem from a different perspective.3 5 According
to the court, an employment nexus with maritime activity is requi-
site, that is, the jurisdictional basis of the claim is the relation of
the function being performed by the injured employee to the water-
borne, rather than land-based, transportation.' Finding Judge
Craven's dissent in .T.O. persuasive, the Third Circuit expressly
rejected the Fourth Circuit's point of rest theory. 37 Although it used
129. Id. at 961. In adopting this test of maritime employment, the court relied heavily on
the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction suggested in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
130. A "pondman" sorts logs and feeds them into the sawmill for processing. In performing
these duties, he walks about on the logs and moves them with pike poles.
131. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953).
132. 528 F.2d at 961-62.
133. 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976).
134. Id. at 636. In Dravo Corp. v. Maxin, 545 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1976), Judge Van Dusen
applied the Sea-Land rationale to a land-based worker in the shipbuilding industry.
135. 540 F.2d at 629.
136. Id. at 638.
137. Id. at 639.
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somewhat different terminology, the court concluded, as had Judge
Craven, that the congressional intent was to extend coverage to all
those employees engaged in handling cargo at the interface between
waterborne modes of transportation and land or airborne modes of
transportation.18
In Sea-Land, the worker had been injured when the truck he was
driving, which was loaded with a large crate, overturned on a public
street in the marine terminal. Upon concluding that the Act could
cover accidents occuring in an area of the terminal that was not
under the employer's control,'39 the court turned to what it deemed
the "crucial issue": whether the injury had occurred when the em-
ployee was engaged in an activity related to stevedoring rather than
to land-based (trucking or warehousing) operations."10
Consistent with its assertion that the line delineating coverage
was to be drawn between maritime and land commerce, in other
words, where cargo is delivered to a separate place for delivery to
the next mode of transportation,"' the court stated that it is irrele-
vant whether one employer is engaged in both types of commerce.
Rather, in determining entitlement to coverage, the relevant func-
tion is that performed at the time of the injury. Inasmuch as the
record was equivocal concerning this crucial fact, the court set aside
the order of the Benefits Review Board and remanded the case."'
Moreover, the court suggested that findings as to the contents,
source, and destination of the crate (for example whether it was full
and destined for a ship) were necessary in establishing whether the
worker was engaged in maritime employment at the time of the
injury.' 43
138. Id. at 638. As the court stated:
[T]he overall intention appears to be to afford federal coverage to all those
employees engaged in handling cargo after it has been delivered from another
mode of transportation for the purpose of loading it aboard a vessel, and to all
those employees engaged in discharging cargo from a vessel up to the time it
has been delivered to a place where the next mode of transportation will pick it
up.
Id. According to the Third Circuit, Judge Craven, in his IT.O. dissent, similarly had es-
poused the view that longshoring "was a continuous process involving different employees,
which continued at all times while the cargo was in maritime commerce as distinguished from




142. Id. at 640.
143. Id. at 639.
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Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of coverage in Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue' and reached results consistent with the
First and Second Circuits. The opinion by Judge Tjoflat paralleled
Judge Friendly's analysis in Pittston but supplied additional defini-
tion in areas left undefined by the other circuit courts. Rather than
enumerating employee classes and functions entitled to coverage,
the Fifth Circuit, as did the Third Circuit, attempted to interpret
the status requirement in the abstract and apply the resulting
guidelines to the various facts of the cases."'
In interpreting the coverage provisions, the Fifth Circuit referred
to the House Report's "typical example" upon which the Fourth
Circuit had based its point of rest theory' and concluded that the
passage in the report established:
no more than that workers who bring cargo to a storage area from
on board ship are covered, while those persons (generally truckers
or railroad personnel) who merely receive cargo and transport it
inland are not covered. The House Committee in this passage did
not even mention those employees who handle cargo between the
first holding area and the cargo's departure via land transporta-
tion. 4
Finding the amorphous guidelines provided by this language inade-
quate, the court relied on language in the committee reports indicat-
ing that employees directly involved in the loading or unloading of
a vessel are to be covered under the Act.' In the absence of explicit
language establishing a point of rest dividing line for shoreside cargo
handlers, the court rejected this arbitrary standard for determining
coverage, adopting instead the more expansive test of whether, at
the time of injury, the claimant actually was performing or directly
involved in loading and unloading functions. 4 ' Thus, the Fifth Cir-
cuit endorsed a broad interpretation of "maritime employment"
based on job function, but refused, as had the Second'50 and Third
144. 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976).
145. Id. at 538-44.
146. See note 70 supra & accompanying text. The House Report is identical to the Senate
Labor and Welfare Committee report.
147. 539 F.2d at 540.
148. See note 100 supra.
149. 539 F.2d at 540.
150. 544 F.2d at 52-53, 56.
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Circuits, 5' to accept general job descriptions or union classifications
as determinative of this function. 52
Such a job function test essentially conforms to the interpretation
advanced in Pittston and followed in Stockman in that it also fo-
cused on the overall process of loading or unloading.'53 Similarly, the
extent of the overall process as defined and applied in Perdue is
consistent with the First, Second, and Third Circuits' views. Ac-
cording to the Fifth Circuit, the unloading process continued until
the last step in transferring cargo from land to sea transportation
was completed, that is, until the cargo departed by land transporta-
tion. "'54 Conversely, the overall loading process commenced when
cargo was received for removal from land transportation.
Although consistent with the First and Second Circuits as to the
basic interpretation of the status requirement, the Fifth Circuit
decision is distinguishable from Pittston and Stockman. Petitioners
in Perdue advocated a limitation on covered employees based on the
committee reports' announced intention "to permit a uniform com-
pensation system to apply to employees who would otherwise be
covered by this Act [before amendment] for part of their activ-
ity."' 55 Precisely this language motivated Judge Friendly, in the
Second Circuit, to restrict coverage for cargo handlers to those who
participated for a considerable amount of time in traditional long-
shoring activities, that is, boarding a ship to directly load and un-
load it.' Similarly, in light of this language, the First Circuit de-
clined to decide expressly whether persons in a class of employees
whose job did not require crossing the water's edge, were entitled to
coverage without demonstrating individually that their duties en-
compassed some shipboard work.'57
151. 540 F.2d at 639-40.
152. The court stated: "We therefore reject respondents' contention that an employee's
general job classification (such as 'longshoreman' or 'ship repairman') will bring him within
the Act's coverage regardless of the nature of the work which he was performing when he was
injured." 539 F.2d at 539.
153. See notes 94, 97, 104-05, 126 supro & accompanying text.
154. See 539 F.2d at 540, 543-44. In defining the limits of the loading and unloading
processes, the court specifically rejected any constructions of the term "maritime employ-
ment" based on pre-1972 decisions. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334
(1953); Nako Chem. Corp. v. Shea, 419 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1969). Because pre-1972 construc-
tions of the term were necessarily limited by the "water's edge" approach, the court con-
cluded that "these older cases simply do not speak to the issue of what landbased employ-
ment is sufficiently maritime to be covered by the new Act." 539 F.2d at 539.
155. See note 68 supra & accompanying text.
156. See note 109 supra & accompanying text.
157. See note 126 supra.
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In rejecting this implied limitation Judge Tjoflat, in the Fifth
Circuit, concluded that:
the Committee was speaking of one inequity of the old "water's
edge" approach, under which cargo handlers would walk in and
out of coverage as they moved between ship and shore. However,
we see no reason to treat this statement as a comprehensive de-
scription of the new Act's coverage, with the result that only those
workers who spend part of their days upon the waters would be
covered. In this passage, the Committee was merely addressing
itself to one anomaly which it wished to eliminate. The same
paragraph clearly states that checkers would be covered by the
new Act, and the Committee gave no indication that coverage
would depend on whether the checkers went on board ship. The
test, rather, was to be whether they were "directly involved in the
loading or unloading functions."'58
The Fifth Circuit, as did the Third Circuit, espoused a purely
functional interpretation of the status requirement, without regard
to the location of the injury within the covered situs and without
reference to any artificial line such as the water's edge or the point
of rest. Referring to legislative history indicating that an injured
employee would be covered if "engaged in loading, unloading, re-
pairing, or building a vessel," but would not be covered merely
because the injury occurred within the covered situs,159 the court in
Perdue concluded, consistent with the Third Circuit's holding that
the worker's activity at the time of injury must be related function-
ally to maritime employment, that to be entitled to coverage, the
employee actually must be performing or directly involved in a cov-
ered job function at the time of injury.'60 In establishing their func-
tional tests, therefore, both courts emphasized that the nature of the
employee's work at the time of injury was the controlling factor
under the status requirement.' Although in propounding func-
tional tests, the Second and First Circuits did not deem determina-
tive the job a worker was performing at the time of injury, it appears
this stance is not in conflict with that of the Third and Fifth Cir-
cuits, but means merely that whether an employee was injured
158. 539 F.2d at 540-41 n.21, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1972)
reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 4698, 4708.
159. See note 70 supra & accompanying text.
160. 539 F.2d at 539.
161. Id.
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while handling cargo shoreward of the point of rest was not disposi-
tive. Yet, that the Fifth Circuit cited approvingly' 2 the Ninth Cir-
cuit's language in Weyerhaeuser stating that the injured employee's
work must bear "a realistically significant relationship" to maritime
employment,"3 demonstrates that the "at the time of the injury"
portion of the test would not extend coverage to a worker such as a
truck driver, who merely offered his assistance in loading cargo and
was then injured.
Two of the five cases consolidated for appeal in Perdue construed
the terms "ship repairman, shipbuilder or ship breaker" as classes
of "maritime employment". Because these terms are well defined
in common usage and precise in their accepted meanings, they are
not as difficult to apply as are the ambiguous "longshoremen" or
"longshoring operations." To illustrate, in Perdue claimant Nulty,
a carpenter, was injured while fabricating a part for a ship within
an area customarily used for shipbuilding and repair.'64 The court
summarily concluded that Nulty was a shipbuilder directly in-
volved in the process of shipbuilding and was therefore entitled to
coverage.'65 Another employee, Charles Skipper, normally employed
as a ship repairman, sustained an injury while dismantling a build-
ing in an abandoned terminal area.' 6 Disregarding Skipper's normal
job classification, the court examined his duties at the time of in-
jury. Concluding that these duties were clearly not encompassed by
the term "ship repairman," the court denied compensation. "' The
court also denied Skipper coverage because he did not satisfy the
situs requirement.
The clear statutory scheme is to cover employees who are injured
while performing certain types of work in an area which is cus-
tomarily used for such work. Whether or not an employer or local
custom has decided to designate an area as a "terminal," for
example, is not dispositive of the situs issue. We will require that
a putative situs actually be used for loading, unloading or one of
the other functions specified in the act .... It will not suffice if
162. Id.
163. 528 F.2d at 961.
164. 539 F.2d at 543.
165. Id. at 544. "In our view, the only reasonable conclusion is that Nulty was directly
involved in an ongoing shipbuilding operation." Id.
166. Id. at 542. The purpose of dismantling the structure was to salvage steel for use in
constructing a new plant that would manufacture sandblasting equipment.
167. Id.
1977]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the area was so used only in the past, or if such uses are merely
contemplated for the future."'
Pursuant to this function-oriented situs requirement another
claimant, Perdue, was denied coverage.
Employed as a shipfitter, Purdue was injured while alighting
from a bus at his employer's office building. The court held that
because the area in which he was injured was not customarily used
for a covered activity he did not satisfy the function-oriented situs
requirement."'
The remaining two cases involved persons claiming either as long-
shoremen or as persons engaged in longshoring operations. Ford and
Bryant, claimants in two remaining cases, were employed on oppo-
site ends of the loading and unloading process. Ford's job function,
fastening cargo to railroad flat cars, was the last step in transferring
cargo from sea to land transportation and as such was directly in-
volved in the process of unloading. "' Bryant's work was unloading
cotton from land transport vehicles to a pierside storage area where
it then was taken on board ships by other employees, and "was an
integral part of the ongoing process of moving cargo between land
transportation and a ship."''
In affirming awards for both Ford and Bryant, the court empha-
sized that both, functions undoubtedly were covered as part of a
continuous operation of moving cargo between a ship's hold and
land transport.7 2 Because neither discontinuity in time nor division
of the process into separate parts changed their work's essential
nature, loading and unloading cargo, the court allowed coverage for
both men.
CONSTRUCTING AND APPLYING CONSISTENT JUDICIAL GUIDELINES
These cases represent the entire body of federal appellate case law
construing the LHWCA status requirement. The ambiguity of the
terms "maritime employment," "longshoreman," and "longshoring
operations" within the status requirement is manifest in the courts'
168. Id. at 541.
169. Id. at 541-42. The office at which Perdue sustained his injury was approximately one
mile from the ship on which he worked. The bus was provided by the employer to transport
employees from the work site to the office at the end of the workday. Id.
170. Id. at 543.
171. Id. at 544.
172. Id. at 543-44.
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non-uniform interpretation of those terms. Despite some divergence
in the decisions, by reconciling the discrepancies in interpreting the
status requirement, some dominant guidelines emerge.
Point of Rest
The Fourth Circuit's point of rest theory, expressly rejected by the
First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, clearly provided the nar-
rowest coverage under the amended LHWCA. The court adopted
the point of rest on the basis of a committee report example that
designated some of those employees covered by the Act.'3 Although
this "typical example" was couched in broad terms, there was no
language in the report supporting its use as an all-inclusive enumer-
ation of employees covered by the Act."I As such, the adoption of
the example as demarcating coverage was unwarranted. Even as-
suming arguendo that the committee intended the example to de-
limit coverage, the point of rest theory interpreted the example
narrowly and was consistent with the example only if any movement
of cargo landward of the first storage or holding area was defined as
transshipment of goods.' Yet such a definition of transshipment
was supported neither by legislative history nor by judicial preced-
ent. 7
6
The major deficiency in the point of rest theory is that it confuses
the situs and status requirements. In creating two distinct require-
ments for coverage under the LHWCA, Congress apparently in-
tended the requirements to comprehend separate criteria. 77 Under
the point of rest theory, essentially geographic and territorial cri-
teria are determinative in that the court focuses on whether the
employee was injured "landward" or "seaward" of the point rather
than on the status or activity of the employee."' Applying this
theory means that workers who fulfill the situs requirement and who
173. See note 68 & 70 supra & accompanying text.
174. See S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d.Sess. (1972) reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698.
175. See note 70 supra & accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Garrett v. Gutzeit, 491 F.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1974); Chagois v. Lykes S.S. Co.,
432 F.2d 388 (5th Cir: 1970); Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965); Thompson v.
Calmar S.S. Corp., 331 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1964); McNeil v. Haubor, 326 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.
Pa. 1971); Olvera v. Michalos, 307 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Tex. 1968). But see Drumgold v. Plouba,
260 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Va. 1966).
177. See note 127 supra & accompanying text.
178. I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Rev. Bd., 529 F.2d at 1096-97 (Craven, J., dissenting).
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perform the same function and handle the same cargo are treated
differently depending on where they are injured. 7' As Judge Craven
noted in his dissent in L T. 0., this is precisely the anomaly the 1972
amendments were designed to correct.8 0 Because acceptance of the
point of rest theory would thus defeat the congressional purpose, it
should be abandoned as a guide for determining coverage under the
LHWCA.
Although point of rest is an indefensible theory, the deliberations
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in I. T. 0. contributed some
significant interpretive concepts. First, in allowing "longshoremen
engaged in moving cargo between ship and point of rest who never
cross the water's edge" to recover, despite language in committee
reports limiting benefits to employees who crossed the water's edge
for part of their activity,' the Fourth Circuit apparently inter-
preted the statute as extending coverage, within the confines of the
point of rest, to employees on the basis of function rather than on a
purely artificial test of whether the employee ever crossed the
water's edge. Second, the court excluded from coverage "employees
whose only responsibility is to pick up stored cargo for trans-
shipment.""18 Although the court incorrectly defined the point at
which transshipment began, such an exclusion would be valid given
a defensible interpretation of transshipment, such as those sug-
gested by the other circuit courts. Third, an additional contribution
of the .T. 0. deliberation was Judge Craven's dissent, forcefully
rejecting the point of rest theory and advocating a more workable
functional approach similar to that later adopted by the other cir-
cuits.,,3
179. Id.
180. Judge Craven stated:
ITihe "point of rest" theory, adopted by the majority means that workers
performing the same function handing the same cargo, will be treated differently
depending upon where they work, even though they are all working on the
premises of a terminal conceded to be within the Act's definition of "navigable
waters." It was precisely this anomaly, where workers exposed to different risks
receive disparate workmen's compensation benefits, which provided the impe-
tus for the 1972 amendments. Thus, the majority effectively holds that the
Congress has failed in its attempt to correct a bad situation, and that coverage
even yet depends upon a fictional location-point of rest-that has no relation
whatever to the inherent risks of employment.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also note 2 supra & accompanying text; Note, Maritime Jurisdic-
tion and Longshoremen's Remedies, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 649, 666.
181. 529 F.2d at 1088.
182. Id. The exclusion was taken from the language of the Senate committee report. See
note 70 supra & accompanying text.
183. Id. at 1089.
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Defining the Problem
Writing for the Second Circuit in Pittston, Judge Friendly em-
phasized the functional aspects of the status requirement, applying
it to employee class and job function criteria. In applying this inter-
pretation of the status requirement, Friendly implicitly categorized
waterfront employees into the following classes: (1) persons directly
engaged in moving cargo on and off ships; (2) persons handling
cargo up to the point at which transshipment begins and who spend
a significant part of their employment in the traditional longshoring
activity of directly moving cargo on and off ships; (3) cargo handlers
who have not spent any significant time in such traditional long-
shoring activity; (4) employees not directly engaged in movement
of cargo; and (5) employees who pick up cargo for transshipment., 4
Concluding that given modern day cargo handling techniques many
longshoremen's traditional jobs are performed on shore, Judge
Friendly included stripping and stuffing containers within the cate-
gory of traditional longshoring activities, and afforded coverage to
strippers and stuffers as a class. 5' Focusing on the functional char-
acteristics of the terms "longshoremen" and "longshoring opera-
tions," the court held any person included in category (1) or (2) to
be entitled to coverage.' The court, however, did not decide
whether cargo handlers who did not cross the water's edge in moving
cargo on or off vessels were entitled to coverage as persons engaged
in "maritime employment." In dicta Judge Friendly excluded from
coverage those employees engaged merely in transshipment' 7 or in
purely clerical or security functions.' 8 As a result, the Second Cir-
cuit's decision merely enumerated some but not all of the employees
covered by the Act, and some excluded under the Act without at-
tempting to devise a general, comprehensive rule.
Similarly, the First Circuit in Stockman applied the LHWCA
automatically to strippers or stuffers.85 Requiring no demonstration
by claimants in this class that they ever crossed the water's edge,5 0
184. 544 F.2d at 53-56. This view adopted and expanded Judge Craven's view in his I.T.O.
dissent that the test is "the nature of his [the maritime worker's] work and not where he
performs it." 529 F.2d at 1097.
185. 544 F.2d at 56.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 54.
188. Id. at 52.
189. 539 F.2d 276.
190. Id. at 277.
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the court held that as members of a class of employees who were
covered under the former Act, strippers and stuffers were covered
under the amended Act. The First Circuit, however, as did the
Second Circuit, expressly refused to decide whether cargo handlers
were engaged in "longshoring operations" or "maritime employ-
ment".'
One result of these two decisions was a partial itemization of
covered employees. More importantly, the excluded category of per-
sons involved merely in further transshipment of stored cargo
seemingly was correctly defined by delineating the point at which
transshipment begins as that at which the consignee actually has
begun movement of the cargo from the pier. Unfortunately, how-
ever, due to language in these decisions, the relationship of cover-
age under the Act to whether an employee or a class of employees
crosses the water's edge during a significant part of their employ-
ment remained unclear.
The Development of the Functional Approach
Rather than enumerating classes of included and excluded em-
ployees, the Ninth, Third, and Fifth Circuits espoused more
comprehensive tests. Weyerhaeuser established the threshold re-
quirement for federal coverage that the claimant's employment at
the time of injury must bear a "realistically significant relation-
ship" to traditional maritime employment involving commercial
navigation upon navigable waters.' Similarly, the Third Circuit in
Sea-Land contended that the crucial issue was "the functional rela-
tionship of the employee's activity [at the time of injury] to mari-
time transportation as distinguished from such land-based activi-
ties as trucking, railroading, or warehousing."'' Although it appears
the imprecision of the terms "realistically significant relationship"
and "functional relationship" might create difficulties in applying
these tests, the Fifth Circuit's Perdue test restricting federal cover-
age to those who, at the time of injury, were performing or were
directly involved in the loading, unloading, repairing, building, or
Such an individual, as is a longshoreman working on the pier alongside a ship
during unloading operations, is a longshoreman within § 902(3). Whatever the
language of the committee reports, the statute itself calls for no additional
showing once that status has been conclusively established. Id.
191. Id.
192. 528 F.2d at 961.
193. 540 F.2d at 638.
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breaking a vessel'94 seems to be defined more clearly and thus should
prove a practical and workable test. Moreover, any blanket coverage
of employees as a class, any reference to the water's edge or any
other artificial line, or any reference to the amount of time spent by
an employee or class of employees aboard ship, does not comport
with such a purely functional test.
Application of the Guidelines: White v. Norfolk & Western
Railway Co.
The only case to apply the Perdue test is White v. Norfolk &
Western Railway Co.,' 5 decided by the Virginia Supreme Court.
The plaintiff, White, suffered hearing damage over a period of two
years while working for the defendant railroad in excessively noisy
electrical rooms in buildings where coal was transferred from rail-
road cars to ships.' The defendant moved to dismiss the suit under
the Federal Employees' Liability Act (FELA)97 on the ground that
the state court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter in that
the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the LHWCA. Reversing
the trial court's dismissal, the court first noted that there was no
issue as to situs because the electrical rooms were clearly in areas
covered by the LHWCA. Thus, the only question was whether
White was engaged in maritime employment under the Act. The
precise facts of the coal-loading operation and White's duties were
crucial to the court's resolution of the status issue and illustrate the
application of the Perdue test to a complex set of facts.
Railroad cars were pushed to a dumper house where machinery
turned them over and shook coal into bins. A series of conveyer belts
transferred the coal to the piers where shiploaders, tall, crane-like
structures, fed coal into ships' holds by means of telescoping chutes.
On piers not equipped with shiploaders, the cars were pushed onto
the pier where a machine picked them up and dumped the coal into
a pan that fed it into the vessel through a telescoping chute.
White, who neither worked for a stevedore nor was a member of a
maritime union, worked in the electrical rooms of the dumper
house, the "house" in which coal was transfered between conveyor
belts, the shiploader, and the machine on the pier not equipped with
194. 539 F.2d at 539-40.
195. No. 751407 (Va. March 4, 1977).
196. Id., slip op. at 7.
197. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
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a shiploader. He did not operate any of the machinery during the
loading process, but maintained and repaired the electrical equip-
ment: a machine in the dumper house that converted current from
A.C. to D.C. and furnished power to dump the cars, a machine
generating electricity for the conveyor belts, electrical equipment
that prevented the chutes on the shiploaders from moving incor-
rectly, and electrical equipment that supplied power to the machin-
ery on the pier not equipped with a shiploader. White did not
handle cargo either mechanically or manually. He only manipulated
the controls of the loading equipment to test it.'
The defendant urged the court to apply the Third Circuit's func-
tional relationship test, maintaining that all of White's work was
functionally related to the loading of coal on ships.' Rejecting this
argument, the court did not articulate clearly whether it was repu-
diating the Third Circuit test or whether, even under that liberal
test, White still was not engaged in maritime employment under the
LHWCA. Rather, relying on language in Weyerhaeuser and Perdue,
the court held that the plaintiff's duties did not have "a realisti-
cally significant relationship to the loading of cargo on ships. Stated
differently, when plaintiff was injured he was not directly involved
in the loading of coal. 200
In light of the Third Circuit's test, the Virginia Supreme Court's
holding is subject to two possible interpretations. First, the court
may have been saying that "functionally related" means "has a
realistically significant relationship to the loading." Therefore, as
the plaintiff's duties had no such relationship, he was not covered
under the Third Circuit's test. Alternatively, the court might have
been saying that, the Third Circuit opinion notwithstanding, it is
not enough that the plaintiff's duties be merely functionally related
to loading. Rather, there must be a realistically significant relation-
ship to or direct involvement in loading.
This ambiguity illustrates the advantage of the Fifth Circuit test
over the Third Circuit test. Given the complex facts of White,
whether the vague functional relationship test is met is uncertain.
Surely White's function had some relationship to loading ships, but
the functon of a repairman, employed by the manufacturer of the
198. The facts of the case are summarized at No. 751407, slip op. at 4-8 (Va. March 4,
1977).
199. Id. at 9.
200. Id. at 11, citing Perdue (emphasis in original).
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generator, who replaces an essential part in the generator once a
year, also would be related to the loading process. It is submitted
that the latter person is clearly outside the purview of the LHWCA.
Yet the functional relationship test does not clearly distinguish be-
tween this person and one who operates loading equipment as it
loads ships.
In contrast to its apparent difficulty with the Third Circuit's test,
the Court applied the Fifth Circuit's test easily and correctly,",
holding that the plaintiff was not directly involved in loading. 02
White, therefore, illustrates that the Fifth Circuit test is practical
and workable. 3 The test includes those physically engaged in
moving cargo in the overall process of loading or unloading, but
excludes those who are not physically connected with moving cargo
although their functions, like those of a guard or clerical worker,
may be necessary to that movement. Thus, the White holding not
only properly applies Perdue but also is consistent with the legisla-
tive history of the LHWCA°'
A PRACTICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUS REQUIREMENT
These combined judicial interpretations, therefore, provide a
framework of guidelines under which to apply the federal coverage
provisions. Until the Fifth Circuit in Perdue propounded the test of
whether the worker actually was participating or directly involved
in maritime activity at the time of injury, the courts had failed to
resolve the ambiguity in the status requirement of the LHWCA. For
example, instead of conclusively interpreting the ambiguities in the
201. Although the court applied the Fifth Circuit test, it did not expressly endorse it. As
the court would have reached the same result by applying any of the circuit courts' tests
except possibly the Third Circuit's, the court may have chosen a liberal standard to show
that even under that standard the plaintiff would not be covered. Indeed, in asserting that
the plaintiff's work must have a realistically significant relationship to loading, the court
relied heavily upon Weyerhaeuser. No. 751407, slip op. at 10 (Va. March 4, 1977).
202. Id. at 11 (Va. March 4, 1977).
203. The facts of White also demonstrate that the Perdue test leads to equitable results.
An employer cannot avoid liability under FELA for failing to provide a safe place to work
merely because his employee's activities bear some relationship to ship-loading. To the con-
trary, it could be argued that the court's decision was erroneous because it leads to the
anomaly of allowing the dumper operator to recover under the LHWCA for hearing loss, but
does not allow the maintenance man, working in the same room, to recover. This argument,
however, is invalid because it would lead to the conclusion-that guards or janitors working in
the dumping room should recover. Yet they clearly are not maritime employees.
204. 539 F.2d at 539, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-1141, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 11 (1972),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4708.
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status requirement and thereby delimiting the Act's coverage, the
First and Second Circuits in effect merely enumerated classes of
employees included or excluded, making determinations on the
basis of inconclusive language in the legislative history. Because the
enumeration of employees either covered or not covered by the Act
did not encompass all employees fulfilling the situs requirement, a
broad category of employees remained in the undefined area be-
tween coverage and non-coverage, 05 so that the guidelines they
promulgated proffered no workable, comprehensive view of the
Act's coverage.
The Fourth Circuit's attempt to establish a firm rule resulted in
the overly restrictive point of rest theory. 00 In contrast, one com-
mentator has asserted that the statute can be fairly read as includ-
ing anyone engaged in waterfront employment. 07 Although this view
arguably was corroborated by the plain language of the statute and
would have simplified the administration of the Act, it is not sub-
stantiated by the statute as a whole. Inclusion of all injuries sus-
tained on the waterfront could have been accomplished by merely
expanding the definition of "navigable waters." As the courts uni-
formly agreed, however, addition of the status requirement refutes
any view of blanket coverage of all waterfront injuries.0 '
Weyerhaeuser emphasized this view by expressly excluding a water-
front employee from coverage;2°" Stockman and Pittston provided
examples of waterfront employees, clerical workers, and guards,
who were obviously not covered by the Act. 10 Therefore, although
this all-inclusive view of the LHWCA's coverage would have been
uniform and easy to apply, neither statutory nor judicial guidelines
support it, for in expanding the territorial scope of covered injuries
205. Within the undefined area are most members of categories (3) and (4), as suggested
by Judge Friendly. See text accompanying note 184 supra.
206. See notes 173-76 supra & accompanying text. In disputing the point of rest analysis
in his dissent, Judge Craven expressed skepticism about the practicality of applying the
theory: "Henceforth, injured employees and their counsel must comb the waterfronts of this
circuit, probing hopelessly for that elusive 'point of rest' upon which coverage depends." 529
F.2d at 1089.
207. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-51 (2d ed., 1975).
208. See Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, 539 F.2d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1976); Pittston
Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1976); I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits
Rev. Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1083 (4th Cir. 1975); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 956,
960 (9th Cir. 1976).
209. 528 F.2d at 959.
210. See notes 187-88 supra & accompanying text.
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Congress definitely narrowed the group of injured persons entitled
to claim compensation."'
Moreover, as both the situs and status requirements are imposed
upon employees, the requirements must complement one another.
Because of the legislative purpose in enacting the LHWCA amend-
ments"' and because of the inference created by adding a status
requirement to the coverage, the focus of the status requirement is
employee function and type of activity. Congress also incorporated
this functional emphasis into the situs requirement which encom-
passes "any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way,
marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used ... in
loading, unloading, repairing or building a vessel." '213 The common
characteristic of a pier, wharf, terminal, and marine railway is that
each is an area where loading and unloading occurs. Applying ele-
mentary rules of statutory interpretation, the inferences are that the
situs requirement was broadened to include all territory in which
covered employees performed employment functions and that the
essential employment function was intended to be the overall load-
ing and unloading process."'
To apply to waterfront conditions, the status requirement must
be interpreted in relation to the realities of the overall process of
loading and unloading vessels. Traditionally, the process entailed
handling cargo piece by piece or unit by unit on slings, pallets, or
skipboards at the ship's side. Under contemporary procedures, how-
ever, the marshalling area for containers and the sheds where cargo
is stored while awaiting vessels for outbound cargo or trucks or rail
cars for inbound cargo have become, in reality, an extension of the
pier necessitated by new technology. The longshoring work, includ-
ing that of checkers and ship maintenance and ship repair men,
previously done on board the vessel or alongside on the pier now, of
necessity, is performed at various locations throughout the ter-
minal. The trucker no longer drives to the ship's side to pick up
cargo. He brings his truck to the shed to pick up destuffed cargo or
211. See note 54 supra & accompanying text.
212. See note 2 supra & accompanying text. All of the courts stressed the congressional
purpose of uniformity and fairness. See, e.g., Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544
F.2d 35, 52-54 (2d Cir. 1976).
213. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. II, 1972) (emphasis supplied).
214. For discussion of statutory interpretation rules apllicable to the amended LHWCA,
see Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REv. 683 (1973).
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to deliver cargo for stuffing."'
Because the status requirement is linked closely to the overall
process of loading and unloading, a practical approach to interpret-
ing the status requirement is to extend coverage throughout this
process. The realities of modern waterfront activity and the case law
on the subject support the contention that the actual loading of a
vessel commences when a carrier delivers goods into the custody of
a terminal operator and that unloading continues until stored cargo
is delivered to a carrier for further transshipment, that is, until the
goods are physically on the consignee's truck.21 Therefore, all per-
sons engaged in handling cargo between these points are involved
in loading or unloading vessels and would be employees within the
meaning of the Act. Similarly, persons not physically connected
with the movement of cargo through the terminal, including guards,
clerical workers, and those who maintain equipment, should not be
deemed members of the covered class of workers engaged in the
maritime employment.
Modern cargo handling is done by a variety of employees, includ-
ing longshoremen, in the normal course of maritime employment.
The clear language of the status requirement and interpretation by
the courts reveal that the criteria for the status requirement were
intended to be employee class and function. Because employees
performing identical functions should receive identical benefits, all
cargo handlers should be entitled to coverage without considering
the geographical point at which injury occurred or whether the em-
ployee crossed the water's edge in the course of employment. These
considerations mandate an interpretation of the status requirement
that includes not only all shipbuilders, ship breakers, and ship re-
pairmen, but that also includes all cargo handlers, longshoremen,
checkers and others physically engaged in movement of cargo in
overall processes of loading and unloading. This functional empha-
sis is consistent with those guidelines provided by the Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Perdue and for the Third Circuit in
Sea-Land."7
Significantly, this interpretation also vindicates the purpose
of the amendments. To effectuate legislative intent, remedial
215. Brief of International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union as Amicus Curiae at
6, I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Rev. Bd., 529 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1976).
216. See note 138 & text accompanying note 154 supra.
217. See notes 133-72 supra & accompanying text.
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legislation such as the 1972 LHWCA amendments should be con-
trued liberally." ' The purpose of amending the Act's coverage, to
insure uniform recovery by maritime employees on the basis of em-
ployment function and status independent of arbitrary territorial
lines, compels the proposed interpretation. The precise definition of
the terms of coverage further corroborate this proposed interpreta-
tion, in that it indicates Congress did not intend or understand the
coverage provisions to require intricate distinctions to be made in
an overlapping and complex area. Consistent with legislative intent
the most clearly defined employee category to which coverage
should be accorded would be the category of all employees, includ-
ing checkers, cargo handlers, strippers, stuffers, and longshoremen,
actually performing or directly involved in the physical movement
of goods during the overall process of loading and unloading. Per-
sons engaged in job functions of this nature at the time of their
injury should be entitled to compensation under the amended
LHWCA.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Pittston"9 corroborates
Judge Friendly's prononcement in Stockman:
Given the importance of the question, the number of courts of
appeals endeavoring to find an answer, and the divergence of
opinion already manifested, it seems unlikely that the opinion of
any court of appeals will be the last word to be said.220
As indicated by its willingness to consider the question, the Su-
preme Court recognizes the importance of uniformity in interpreting
the LHWCA's amended coverage provisions and in applying the
status requirement. Uniformity, however, may be achieved by var-
ious means. The LHWCA of 1927 imposed uniformity by limiting
coverage to injuries occurring seaward of the Jensen line; the Fourth
Circuit, in I. T. 0., suggested a point of rest at which coverage would
uniformly terminate. Yet the problem confronting the Supreme
Court is not simply to achieve a uniform application of the LHWCA,
but rather to propound a uniform rule effectuating the equitable
218. See I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Rev. Bd., 529 F.2d 1080, 1091 (4th Cir. 1975) (Craven,
J., dissenting).
219. Northeast Marine Terminals Inc. v. Caputo, 97 S. Ct. 522 (1976).
220. 544 F.2d at 39.
19771
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
purposes of the 1972 amendments. Excluding the point of rest
theory of the Fourth Circuit, the appellate courts focused on the
functional aspects of the status requirement, beginning with Judge
Craven's L T. 0. dissent and culminating in the Fifth Circuit's work-
able, purely job function approach. Adherence to the Perdue stan-
dard of determining the nature of the employee's work at the time
of injury provides an adequate framework of guidelines for applying
the LHWCA by limiting coverage to all persons either actually per-
forming or directly involved in the physical movement of cargo dur-
ing the overall process of loading and unloading. Interpreting the
statute to include these persons advances the legislative goal to
protect employees on the basis of status or function rather than on
the purely geographical criteria of the original Act. Moreover, that
this suggested delineation is also the most clearly defined functional
or status category, facilitates practical, uniform application of the
statute to diverse facts. Thus, by adopting this interpretation of the
status requirement, the Supreme Court would insure uniform recov-
ery by injured maritime employees without regard to the employee's
fortuitous position at the time of injury.
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